made a desert and called it peace. The peace sentiment is not best inspired by the roar of cannon and the spectacle of mighty fleets.

In time of peace, therefore, let us prepare for peace; for such preparation means that the victory is practically won. As a safeguard against fighting, the State has forbidden a person to carry concealed weapons; and the gentleman no longer wears a sword. Is it safer or more civilized for a nation that would avoid conflict to arm itself to the teeth? To look upon the cost of mighty armaments as an expenditure for peace insurance is as absurd as to regard a ton of dynamite placed in the cellar as a safe means of insuring a house against burglary.

Even more subtle is the second fallacy in which militarism takes refuge: the notion that questions of "national honor" should not be submitted to arbitration. A famous American, with characteristic vigor, has recently made use of it in combating the Taft treaties. Here, again, we have an example of the lower plane of international conduct as compared with individual conduct. Theodore Roosevelt applies to nations the ethics of the dueling code. This is the sort of "Honor," with a capital "H," which led Hamilton to accept Burr's challenge. The law no longer licenses certain "fighting words" as sufficient to justify an individual in shooting another in defense of superfine points of personal honor. Why should civilized nations make similar reservations in dealing with each other?

America's Mission.

Here is a worthy task for this newborn society to perform. May it not aid in molding in Nebraska a sound public opinion which shall repudiate the immoral doctrine that our nation can have any honorable purpose or any sound policy which may not safely be settled by reason, by discussion, by arbitration?

Suspect the policy or the conduct which may not endure the light of open discussion!

As a world power, I verily believe that our country has a great mission to perform—to carry the blessing of peaceful democracy to the peoples of the East. This mission it can carry out only by living righteously, by acting justly toward other nations. To fulfill it, we have no need of mighty fleets. For our safety at home and for our peaceful aggression abroad, the only armament that we need is high national character. Economically, politically, and morally, the surest guaranty of our national greatness is leadership in the movement for world peace.

"For surely, very surely will come the Prince of Peace,
To still the shrieking shrapnel and bid the Maxims cease,—
Not as invaders come
With gun-wheel and with drum,
But with the tranquil joyance of lovers going home
Through the scented summer twilight, when the spirit has release.

"By sea and plain and mountain will spread the larger creed,
The love that knows no border, the bond that knows no breed;
For the little word of right
Must grow with truth and might,
Till monster-hearted Mammon and his sycophants take flight,
And vex the world no longer with rapine and with greed."

—*Bliss Carman.*

The General Arbitration Treaties.

Speech of Hon. Porter J. McCumber, of North Dakota, in the Senate of the United States, Thursday, January 18, 1912.

(*Concluded from February number.*)

Mr. President, I wish briefly to answer the arguments of the majority report. By Article I the matter submitted must—

First. Relate to international matters and not to matters which are internal or which relate exclusively to what each government may properly regard as a policy, as essential to its own maintenance, life, progress, prosperity, and independence, as its internal affairs;

Second. The question must be a claim of right made by one against the other; and

Third. The claim must be justiciable in its nature by reason of being susceptible of decision by the application of the principles of law and equity.

I wish to give my most vigorous dissent to the rule laid down by the majority in their report of the construction of the words "law and equity," and to agree most heartily with the construction placed upon those words by the Senator from Maryland [Mr. Rayner].

Every country must, of course, determine for itself what policies or subjects are international and what are not, and it will naturally be supposed that no government would ever submit to arbitration a matter recognized as essential to its own safety and independence. For instance, every country by its own laws determines who may and who may not become citizens of such country. The safety of such country depends upon the solidarity of its own citizenship. A non-assimilable people have always proved to be dangerous to any country of which they are a component part. We have a living illustration of that fact in the terrible struggle between the Manchus and the Chinese in China today. Each country has an inherent right to determine for itself whether a people of a particular color or a particular religion is conducive to its peace and safety, and therefore to determine whether or not such people shall be excluded from its citizenship or from its territory. Therefore, no such question could be submitted to arbitration, because it is a purely internal question. It would be as improper to submit such a question to arbitration as it would to try to compel two men, one a vegetarian and one a flesh eater, to submit to arbitration which diet the other should adopt. That is a matter for each to determine and not for one to impose upon the other.

Our Monroe Doctrine stands exactly upon the same footing. We long ago determined that our safety as a nation forbade the extension of the territorial domain of any European country over the Western Continent. That is declared to be a policy of this country just as essential to its welfare as the exclusion of undesirable people from its citizenship. Every country of Europe has impliedly, at least, recognized that policy. But whether recognized or not, no country could claim that from our standpoint it is a justiciable question. Therefore, no such question could possibly be submitted to arbitration, for both countries must agree that the question is an arbitrable one.

Other questions of like character may arise. Probably in three years we shall have completed the Panama

Canal. While practically a highway for all nations, it is nevertheless peculiarly an American waterway. It is our property. We may regard it as a necessary highway for the mobilization of our warships in either Atlantic or Pacific waters. We may take such means to guard and protect it as we may deem necessary. We may properly say that this is an American question, not an international question, and not one that could be submitted to arbitration.

For the same reason Great Britain holds Gibraltar; for the same reason she controls the Suez Canal; for the same reason she guards the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. She may properly say to the world; "These are British questions solely; we regard the protection of this natural as well as artificial highway as necessary for the protection of our domains beyond the sea, even necessary to supply our own people with the food they cannot raise. Our national safety demands that we shall not allow that highway to be threatened." She would very properly refuse to submit matters of that character to arbitration.

Again, by Article I, it is provided that these questions must be justiciable in their nature by being susceptible to decision by application of the principles of law and equity. I am compelled to disagree with the report of the majority of the committee, in which they say:

"We are obliged, therefore, to construe the word 'equity' in its broad and universal acceptance as that which is equally right or just to all concerned; as the application of the dictates of good conscience to the settlement of controversies."

"Law and equity," used together anywhere in the English language, have a technical meaning. The words "law and equity" are never understood to mean law and justice. The phrase has its genesis in English and American jurisprudence, and when used in a legal instrument carries the technical meaning. We often use French phrases in our English literature, and when so used the French significance of the words would govern. If we were dealing with Great Britain alone. as we are in one treaty, I cannot conceive of there being any claim that they should have other than their technical meaning as used, and always used and understood by both countries. And if we use this English and American term in a treaty with France, it should have the English and American construction, exactly the same as a French phrase should have a French construction though used in an English document.

There is a wide distinction between "law and equity" and "law and justice." All laws are not just. Therefore justice may not harmonize with positive law. We cannot have an equity that is opposed to law. Equity carries out the good intent and purpose of the law, which by reason of its universality may be deficient in detail or forms of execution to meet the equitable requirements of a particular case, but, unlike "justice," equity can never conflict with positive law.

Let us elucidate this by a very late case which was before the Senate, the termination of the Russian treaty. I was surprised to note that a very popular writer in one of our magazines suggested that this was a case for arbitration. This was not and could not be made a cause of arbitration. In 1868 we declared by positive law the right of any citizen of any country in the world who came to this country and lived here, and whom we might choose to adopt, to expatriate himself from his former allegiance and to become in every respect an American citizen. That law is an internal affair that has to do with the rights of our own people and of their citizenship. No matter what the equity, neither this Government nor the Russian government could properly submit its laws relating to its internal policies to any court of arbitration. And in that respect we have a fair demonstration of the difference between law and equity and what some people might call law and justice.

If it is claimed by any foreign country that it has a right to deny a citizen of its country the right of expatriation, and that country should try to make that a question of arbitration upon the grounds of equity, we would answer that equity as read in this instrument always means an equity subject to the positive law of the land, and therefore such a question could not be submitted to arbitration because opposed to the law of the land.

It might be added with equal force that in this particular case there was absolutely no occasion for arbitration, because there was no difference between the parties as to the right of either party to terminate the agreement. The instrument itself declared in positive terms the right of such termination by either government, and therefore there was no possible controversy as to that right being exercised by either party. Not only this, but by the positive law of 1868 we had in effect abrogated that treaty so far as it related to the right of expatriation. It had not been binding upon us since that date, and we only did by direction what we had previously done by implication.

Questions, however, may arise as to whether certain disputes are within the category of those which are excluded from arbitration by reason of not being justiciable.

Had a treaty of this kind been in existence during the last Cleveland administration, the last clause of Article III could well have been made use of in determining whether or not a case was clearly within the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine excludes any European power from extending its territorial limits at the expense of any American country. A dispute arose between Great Britain and Venezuela as to whether certain territory was British or Venezuelan territory. British forces were landed, as I remember, to hold a large tract of country which was claimed by Venezuela. If such territory rightfully belonged to Venezuela, then there could be no question but that its seizure and permanent holding by Great Britain would violate our Monroe Doctrine. President Cleveland, in diplomatic terms, after setting forth our ancient doctrine, desired an expression from the British government of its purpose. The very leisurely manner in which the British government proceeded in the matter brought about the famous message of President Cleveland, abrupt and threatening, and which well might have endangered the peace of the country. In due time, or, from our standpoint, past due time, the British government stated its purpose was to hold only such territory as it claimed actually belonged to it. This Government conceded that the question as to where a boundary line was located was a proper matter for arbitration; that while the Monroe Doctrine itself was not an arbitrable question,

still the question as to the proper location of a boundary line between a South American republic and British territory in South America was a question of that character. We have followed the same policy since that time in adjusting our own boundary lines with Great Britain, and it is just this which calls for this joint high commission, and without which we might possibly, under some circumstances, not be able to bring a matter before the Senate when it ought to be brought before it.

It seems to be conceded by the majority report that the special agreement for submission either to The Hague or to the other arbitral tribunal must be submitted to the Senate. But right here the report of the majority seems to lay itself open to the criticism that it is illogical in that it assumes that while the matter must be submitted to the Senate for its concurrence, the submission is perfunctory only and the Senate has no right to question the finding of the joint high commission.

After quoting the clause sought to be stricken out, the report says:

"It will be seen by an examination of the clause just quoted that if the joint commission, which may consist of one or more persons, which may be composed wholly of foreigners or wholly of nationals, decides that the question before them is justiciable under Article I, it must then go to arbitration, whether the treaty-making power of either country believes it to be justiciable or not. A special agreement coming to the Senate after the joint commission had decided the question involved to be justiciable could not be amended or rejected by the Senate on the ground that in their opinion the question was not justiciable and did not come within the scope of Article I."

I answer this by saying that the treaty does not so provide. The treaty, which must be considered as a whole, declares, first:

"The reports of the commission shall not be regarded as decisions of the questions or matters so submitted, either on the facts or on the law, and shall in no way have the character of an arbitral award."

The treaty further states:

"If all, or all but one, of the commission agree and report that such difference is within the scope of Article I, it shall be referred to arbitration in accordance with the provisions of this treaty."

How is it to be referred in case of a finding of a commission that it is justiciable? It is to be referred in accordance with the provisions of the treaty, and the provisions of the treaty are, first, as provided in Article I, that the agreement can only be made by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and as provided in Article III, that the report of the commission shall not be regarded as a decision on either the law or the fact, so that under the actual wording of the treaty, the Senate has a duty to perform, and it is inconceivable to me that those who negotiated this instrument should have solemnly provided that each agreeemnt should be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent and as solemnly intended that it should do nothing but consent.

If the negotiators had so intended they would naturally have said, "and if all or all but one of the members of the commission agree and report that such difference is within the scope of Article I, it shall be arbitrated," without further action, instead of saying, "It shall be referred to arbitration in accordance with the provisions of this treaty."

Again the report says:

"Under these circumstances to vest in an outside commission the power to say finally what the treaty means by its very general and indefinite language is to vest in that commission the power to make for us an entirely different treaty from that which we supposed ourselves to be making."

How this assertion can be made when the very right, the final right, to pass upon the question whether or not a matter shall be submitted to arbitration rests in the Senate itself, is beyond my understanding.

Again, the report says:

"For instance, if another nation should do something to which we object under the Monroe Doctrine, and the validity of our objection should be challenged and an arbitration should be demanded by that other nation, the vital point would be whether our right to insist upon the Monroe Doctrine was subject to arbitration. And if the third clause of Article III remains in the treaty the Senate could be debarred from passing upon that question."

If the third clause of Article III remains in that treaty the Senate would not only not be debarred from passing upon that question, but by the very terms of that last clause, providing that the matter shall be referred to arbitration in accordance with the provisions of the treaty, the Senate would be compelled to pass upon that question. I do not for a moment concede that any arbitral tribunal appointed by a President who himself had declared that the subject was not one for arbitration and who appointed the members of the joint high commission would hold that a proposition so clear as the Monroe Doctrine could possibly be made a subject of arbitration, but if they should so hold, still their holding could not be final until the Senate had also so advised.

Again, the report says:

"If our right to exclude certain classes of immigrants were challenged, the question would be forced before a joint commission, and if that commission decided that the question was arbitrable the Senate would have no power to reject the special agreement for the arbitration of that subject on the ground that it was not a question for arbitration within the contemplation of Article I."

I have shown that by every clause in the treaty the question must finally go to the Senate. To refer does not mean that it is actually to be arbitrated, but simply that it is to take the regular course of reference; first, in the form of the special agreement; and, second, to the Senate for its advice and consent. If that is conceded, as I understand it is, then I submit that it was not intended that referring the matter to the Senate for its advice and consent was a mere idle ceremony. And yet that is the construction that must be placed upon it to support the assertions I have mentioned in the majority report.

Again, the report says:

"To take from the Senate, in any degree or by any means, the power of saying whether a given question is one for arbitration or not is to destroy the power of the Senate on the most important point to be decided in connection with differences arising with any other nation."

Everyone admits that proposition. This treaty not only does not take away from the Senate, in any degree or by any means, the power to say whether a given question is one for arbitration, but there is no power that could take that away from the Senate. It is a constitutional right that cannot be denied. The President, who negotiated this treaty, understands that as well as any Member of the Senate. And I certainly feel that I would be showing great disrespect for his legal acumen if I supposed that he had forgotten that in making this treaty or that either he or the Secretary of State, one of the profound lawyers of the country, should have so purposed.

Everywhere in the majority report we find that the words "in accordance with the provisions of this treaty," the last eight words of the article sought to be stricken out have been entirely ignored; have been treated as though they did not exist for any purpose whatever. If those who agree with the majority report hold that they did intend to give meaning to those words, and that those words do mean that the agreement must nevertheless be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent, then they are forced back on the very frail argumentment that, notwithstanding the fact that the Senate is invited and required to exercise the function of advising and consenting by the terms of the treaty, it can only advise in the affirmative. Such is not a reasonable construction.

I submit there is just as much reason for saying that the Senate is debarred from exercising its judgment as to whether the case is an arbitrable one when submitted by the President, who, without the action of the commission, must of necessity and by implication does find when he submits the matter to the Senate that it is arbitrable, as to suppose that the Senate is debarred when it is submitted to it in consequence of the finding of the commission.

Does not the Senate act exactly in the same way whether the matter comes before it on a decision by the President that the case is within the provisions of Article I, or a decision by the joint high commission of inquiry that the case is within the provisions of Article I? Both the President and the commission have to find that fact. The President of his own motion will not submit the matter unless he finds it falls within the provisions of Article I, and if the President holds that it is not within the provisions of Article I, then there is no way of getting it before the Senate, unless we have some other body that may say that it does fairly come within the provisions of Article I. In each instance the purpose is to secure the initiatory steps and bring the matter before the Senate. In each instance it is declared that it shall go before the Senate for its advice and consent, and there is nothing to be found in the instrument which says that the power of the Senate shall be limited in any way when the matter is brought before it. Why are we precluded from exercising our judgment in one case more than in the other? Both Article I and the last clause of Article III say in effect that the case shall be submitted or referred to arbitration if found to be a proper question for arbitration, not found by the Senate to be a proper case for arbitration, but if it is found by the President to be a case for arbitration, then it is "submitted" to arbitration under the first article, and if it is found by this committee to be a case for arbitration, then it is "referred" instead of "submitted" to arbitration.

I ask that Senators shall especially note that the declaration that the cause shall be submitted to arbitration is the same in each case. Under Article I the President decides whether the difference is justiciable, and if he so finds that article declares it "shall be submitted to the permanent court of arbitration." Under Article III the commission decides whether the question is justiciable, and if it so finds that article declares it "shall be referred to arbitration in accordance with the provisions of the treaty." While the language is general in each section, the provision being that the matter is to be submitted or referred to arbitration, the same proceeding is contemplated in each case—the formation of a special agreement and its submission to the Senate for its advice and consent.

If Senators will bear in mind that the great prime purpose of the creation of the joint high commission is to investigate the facts and assure that the preliminary steps will be taken to get the matter before the Senate, when it is so clearly within the rule that all, or all but one, of the nationals of both countries so hold, the harmonious construction becomes simple and rational.

The whole question turns upon the purpose of the creation of this joint high commission. The instrument says, and I say, that the function of the commission is to investigate and to insure the proper preliminary steps to be taken which may eventually result in arbitration, where, without the intermediary action of the commission, no such step might be taken, either because the executive heads of the nation are disinclined to act or hold a contrary view. I think that a careful reading of the whole instrument will convince any Senator, whose mind has not already been made up on the matter, that the purpose of the creation of the commission is not to supersede the Senate in determining what is justiciable, and that it is not intended by the last phrase of Article III to make an exception to the advisory character of the report whereby on the principal question, that of the justiciability of the difference, its decision is to be conclusive; but such purpose is to investigate and assure a consideration by the treaty-making power of all questions which seem to be so clearly within the rule of Article I as to secure unanimous or nearly unanimous approval by a commission of men learned in international law and ethics.

Mr. President, just one word on the merits, and then I will close.

Mr. President, our appropriation for the Army and Navy in 1891 was $68,342,507. In 1911 our appropriation was $226,791,421, an increase of 230 per cent in 20 years.

The British appropriation in 1891 was $154,560,782. In 1911 it was $332,931,219, an increase of 115 per cent in 20 years.

How long can this condition continue? The increase of our population during those 20 years was but 44 per cent. The increase of the population of Great Britain was 20 per cent.

Our appropriation for our Army and Navy increased five and one-fourth times as rapidly as our population. The British increase was five and one-half times as rapid as her population. Who can fail to see that the real end must be the question of which country will first become

bankrupt or paralyzed in its further efforts? The race is toward national pauperism. The nations of the Old World are today being pauperized to defend themselves against each other. Blindly every nation is struggling to outdo the other in the size of its armament and its power for aggression. Before another 20 years, at the same rate of increase in the cost of preparedness for war, the countries of Europe will reach a state where every other governmental interest must be sacrificed to yield to the single demand for the creation and maintenance of armaments.

This condition is a crime against civilization. No country in the world is so situated as is our own country, guarded as she is by the seas, independent as she is of support from any foreign source, to take the initiative, and with a strong, earnest, and brave purpose bring about a cessation of this senseless, of this worse than criminal, expenditure of human energy for the production of that which does not tend to the happiness of the world, but whose one purpose is to destroy that happiness.

Even in the United States in times of peace, without a single war cloud in the horizon, nearly three-fourths of our governmental receipts are immediately poured into the war coffers for the maintenance of the Army and Navy and the payment of pensions.

The pride of this city is our Congressional Library. From the lips of every person who for the first time enters its portals bursts forth an exclamation of joy and pride. It cost just one-half as much as a completed warship, to say nothing of the maintenance of the latter after completion. This beautiful structure will last a thousand years. The warship will become obsolete and useless in 10 years. We are suffering for a want of sufficient buildings to conduct the business of the country, and enormous sums are paid annually for rent, and yet the appropriation which we make every year for war purposes would build 30 of these libraries, 300 of them in 10 years. We are unable, while we are pouring these vast sums into our armament, to even appropriate the necessary funds to complete the work of our Census Bureau, and we must leave all its important data, collected at great expense, until a time when it will be obsolete and useless.

And what profit is it to us that because of our greater resources we shall be able to outstrip all other nations of the world in the construction and maintenance of a mighty navy? Every dollar that we compel them to expend in an attempt to keep abreast of our power means a dollar that might have bought our goods. We are by this race for war power destroying the ability of our customers to purchase our wares, and our people in the end will suffer the result. If the money expended for war purposes the world over could be expended in the comforts and luxuries of life, we would all be comparatively wealthy. If the vast energy expended in the maintenance of armies and navies could be utilized for the real benefit of humanity, we could have a paradise of plenty on earth.

You say preparedness for war is the surest guaranty of peace. As between two nations of equal power, with no contract or agreement or understanding to bind them to a rule of conduct that would be applied to the citizens of each, it may be possibly true that the one must continue to increase its power to meet the threatening strength of the other. As against the smaller and weaker powers, however, it is the surest guaranty of war.

But where will we end? Each additional expense in the national armament of one nation invites an additional expense on the part of the other, until the whole civilized world is groaning under the enormous burden of taxes required for their maintenance.

Let us pass these arbitration treaties. Let us secure like treaties with all the nations, and we shall immediately see an ever-diminishing war budget and an ever-corresponding increase of the world's prosperity and happiness.

Mr. President, I feel that we do not fully recognize or appreciate the far-reaching influence of the confirmation of these treaties. I feel confident that as soon as these treaties with Great Britain and France are confirmed by the Senate the cause of arbitration as a settlement of all arbitrable differences will receive such an impetus that we shall be able to make like treaties with Germany, Austria, Italy, and every civilized country in the world.

Mr. President, here is another most important matter which we must not overlook, a matter that is far more important than the mere settlement of arbitrable questions. Whenever the great nations of the world agree to submit all differences which are justiciable or arbitrable in their nature to an international tribunal, it will force that tribunal and the parties who submit their differences to its adjudication to determine the line of demarcation between the vital, inherent, God-given, and sacred rights of each nation, great and small, and to recognize those rights. And when we have advanced civilization to such a degree that the great nations of the world will sign similar compacts wherein they recognize certain sacred rights of other weaker nations as non-assailable, we have done for the peace of the world a hundred times more than is secured by the mere submission of minor differences to arbitration.

With a treaty of this character, signed by all the great countries of the world, the war with Tripoli would never have been heard of. With a treaty of this kind, signed by all the great nations of the world, including Russia, the cries of Persia for justice and mercy would not now be ringing throughout the world.

There is nothing so powerful today as aroused public opinion. It makes wars and it stops wars. There is something in a written contract, though it binds countries to nothing more than that which honor should bind them, the breach of which by any nation would bring down upon it the condemnation of every other nation.

There are few countries in the world today which can wage a great war without borrowing from other countries. The time is coming, and ought to come, when no great nation of the world shall be able to borrow money from other civilized nations for the purpose of carrying on an unjust war. It was due to a great world sympathy for Japan in her struggle for the maintenance of her national life that enabled her to carry on that war against a country with a population and resources five times greater than her own and with a territory 500 times greater. Flushed with victory, her inclination was to demand an indemnity, but when she had gained all she had demanded as her inherent right for her self-preservation, public opinion would not sustain her in a

war continued for the purpose of securing money indemnity. And it was that public opinion that brought about peace between the contending nations.

I wish, Mr. President, that it were within my power to impress the Senate with my own conviction of the duty which we owe to the world, to humanity, to all future generations, to consummate this first great act of world statesmanship—to lay this corner-stone in the temple of universal law and justice. I have little patience with those who pronounce as a fanciful dream the prophecy of the dawn of a day when nations shall be governed in their relations with each other by the same code of morals which every State exacts of its own people in their inter-relations. The sentiment of the people of the civilized world is today against all international injustice. But so long as there is no power other than the unrestrained will of a greedy government to restrain it from unjust acts, so long will the stronger of such governments rob and plunder the weaker.

In the slow evolution of the human race there came a time when the consensus of all the people declared that the individual should no longer be arbitrator of his differences with his neighbor; that justice and right should no longer be measured according to the judgment of him who could wield the biggest club. And they placed their united strength and their unbiased judgment against the distorted idea of right as entertained by the man with the bigger club.

I fancy many men in that far-off period assumed and declared that this invasion was contrary to human proclivities, and so long as human nature retained the element of greed and injustice the strong would override the weak. And undoubtedly many of those of a bellicose disposition declared that it would be hypocritical to create a court to try those differences when, as a matter of fact, the individual did not intend to allow any tribunal to govern him in what he deemed a matter of his own business.

But they did create a court, and they did obey that court, backed, as it was, by the whole power of society. And because of that restraint we have all we know of twentieth-century civilization.

Mr. President, we have today reached another stage in world progression, whereby we purpose to force, by the power of the world's sentiment, supplemented by the combined obligation of national compacts of every nation to abide by the same code of morals in their international relations that they in turn exact from their subjects, namely, that they rob no other nation of its honor, that they steal not its territory, that they murder not its people; and I sincerely hope that the great Government of the United States will be the first government that shall attempt to lay the corner-stone of this edifice of international justice.

Christianity and the Peace Movement. An Appeal to the Churches.

By Edward L. Parsons.

In an article on "The War Against War," in a recent *Atlantic Monthly*, Mr. Havelock Ellis, enumerating the factors making toward permanent international peace, dismisses Christianity from among them with the remark: "The influence of the religion of peace has in this matter been less than nil."

The judgment is too sweeping. It ignores much that the Christian church has done; but it is a grievous thing that it can be uttered at all. It is a grievous thing that there is so much truth in it. The Christian church has never stood as it ought to stand toward the peace movement. It has never in determined and thorough fashion preached the abolition of war as an immediate and pressing business of Christian people. It has been inert and unprotesting while nations have built armies and navies, trained their citizens for war, and accepted war as a normal phase of life. It has failed to see the implications of its own principles.

The great and terrible indictment against Christianity in this matter, against thousands of Christian ministers and myriads of Christian people, is that they are afraid. They will not trust their religion. They will not trust humanity, nor the might of truth and righteousness. They profess a religion of faith in God and man. They profess to believe in a moral world order. They profess to believe that it was better to sustain the kingdom of God by sacrifice and death than by twelve legions of angels. "Thinkest thou that I cannot beseech my Father, and he shall even now send me more than twelve legions of angels?" spoke Christ at His trial, and His followers profess to rejoice that He would not pray for the aid of the legions. All this they profess, but when it comes to war and the preparation for war they are afraid to trust God and humanity. They like guns and steel plate better, and have much to say of the disgrace of "peace at any price."

Let us look at the matter more closely, endeavoring to understand it not in the light of international politics, but in that of Christianity alone. War is successfully routed from the modern world. It has gone with slavery and polygamy and other evils into the class of institutions which no one defends. They all exist more or less, but their fight is a losing fight.

We have no longer to argue against war. We may assume that it is bad. When, however, we try to touch the conscience of the Christian world upon the matter, we encounter two kinds of difficulties. There are those who say that although war is bad, it cannot very well be done away. Men, as long as they are men, will have passions, and now and again these passions will break out in war. Of course, we do not want it, but we must expect it. For a Christian there is only one reply to such opinion. It is unworthy, inconsistent, faithless! The Christian's faith is a faith in miracles. He believes that the most fearful passions can be tamed. It is a faith in righteousness. He believes that evil must be conquered. It is a faith in God. He believes that the future—the only future to which he can look forward—is God's future. These are facts about the Christian's faith which cannot be doubted. In face of them, how can Christian men, even Christian ministers, let such dull faithlessness beset them? They do not want to be dreamers, they say—but dreamers? It is the dreamers who inherit the earth. It is to the dreamer that the future belongs, not to the literalist and the practical man. The practical man judges men by those he sees in the street. The dreamer knows them better, for he judges them by Jesus Christ. No, the Christian faith gives us no standing ground for hopelessness. If war is evil and unrestrained, passion is evil; if there are better ways of settling things than by force, then war must go.